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Abstract
The U.S. military has an increased need to rapidly identify and combat non-
conventional adversaries. Dismount detection systems are being developed and ex-
panded to provide more information and identify any potential threats. Current work
in this area utilizes multispectral imagery to exploit spectral properties of exposed
skin and clothing. These methods are useful in the location and tracking of dismounts
but do not directly discern a dismounts level of threat. However, by performing pose
recognition and identification it can be possible to discern this threat information.
Pose recognition is the process of observing a scene through an imaging device(s), de-
termining that a dismount is present, identifying the three dimensional (3D) position
of the dismount’s joints, and evaluating what the current configuration of the joints
means. This thesis explores the use of automatic pose recognition to identify threaten-
ing poses and postures by means of an artificial neural network. The data is collected
utilizing the depth camera and joint estimation software of the Kinect for Xbox 360.
A threat determination is made based on the pose identified by the network. Ac-
curacy is measured both by the correct identification of the pose presented to the
network, and proper threat discernment. The end network achieved approximately
81% accuracy for threat determination and 55% accuracy for pose identification with
test sets of 26 unique poses. This disparity is a result of commonly confused poses in
the network being of the same threat level as the pose presented. Overall, the high
level of threat determination accuracy indicates that automatic pose recognition is a
promising means of discerning whether a dismount is threatening or not.
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Dismount Threat Recognition Through Automatic Pose
Identification
I. Introduction
The United States Air Force has listed one of its top priorities as “getting more
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance to the war zone” [6]. This priority is a
direct result of encounters with unconventional adversaries, such as individuals (dis-
mounts) dressed in civilian attire attacking crowds of people. The Joint Improvised
Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), Air Force Research Laboratories
Layered Sensing Technology Division, and other military organizations are interested
in the identification of dismounts and the ability to discern their intentions [7]. Dis-
mount detection systems have the potential to provide information pertaining to a
dismount’s capability to do harm, intended target(s), and opportunities. The infor-
mation provided by these systems can be used to predict and prevent hostile actions
against friendly assets.
Dismount detection and recognition involves identifying the presence of a dis-
mount, discerning physical characteristics and attributes, assessment of the surround-
ing situation, and analyzing the information. The Sensors Exploitation Research
Group at the Air Force Institute of Technology at Wright Patterson Air Force Base,
Ohio has created several methods to detect and track dismounts within surveillance
data [8–13]. Brooks, Koch, Nunez and Poskosky [8, 11–13] develop and refine skin-
cued dismount detection systems through the use of multispectral image analysis.
Climer [10] expands the applicability of the skin-cued dismount detection by over-
coming certain pose limitations. Clark [9] uses a stochastic non-redundant feature
selection method on hyperspectral data sets to detect and characterize clothing.
The automobile industry continues to refine pedestrian avoidance systems to assist
drivers [14,15]. Microsoft’s Kinect for Xbox 360 [3] uses real-time human pose recog-
nition to provide more interactive gaming experiences where the human body is the
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controller [5]. All of these efforts provide pieces of information useful to dismount
threat recognition.
Much of the work performed at AFIT [8, 10–13] deals primarily with detecting
the presence of dismounts within imagery using information collected in the near-
infrared (NIR) and short wave infrared (SWIR). Different types of dismount charac-
terization and classification are needed to provide threat information. Aspects such as
equipment being carried, posturing and movement patterns, physical attributes of the
dismount, and the surrounding situation are indicators that aid the threat recognition
process.
1.1 Problem Statement
Many actions that humans perform can be broken down into sub actions or
sequences of events. If an observer sees a weapon being drawn, they assume it is
likely to be used in the near future and that the situation has become dangerous.
The intent of this thesis is to enable a computer system to observe and recognize
dangerous situations. According to Karl Rehn, a National Rifle Association (NRA)
instructor, and his associates [16] firing a handgun accurately at a target is a seven
stage sequence:
1. gripping the gun in its holster,
2. drawing it up out of the holster,
3. pointing the gun directly at the target,
4. bringing your other hand into position forming a solid two-handed grip and
clicking off the safety,
5. sighting the gun at the target,
6. pulling the trigger until a shot is fired,
7. and taking your finger off the trigger and flicking the safety back on until ready
to fire again.
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Recognizing the first stage, when a hand is gripping a weapon and preparing to
draw, provides valuable warning time for bystanders and personnel to seek cover or
intervene. Gripping a weapon typically involves one of several common postures.
These postures can be observed using the method developed by Shotton et al [5] and
mapped as 3-dimensional (3D) joint positions. Their method was chosen because it
produces joint estimates in real time, is readily available using commercial devices
and software, and is unaffected by body shape and clothing.
Breaking down hostile situations into a sequence of events reveals indicators and
markers that are used to predict and prevent the situation. This thesis focuses on
identifying the actions that lead up to dangerous or threatening events and developing
a way to detect those actions automatically. The goal is to provide early warning
that an event may occur and a confidence level at which the prediction is made.
An ontological view of human behavior is used throughout this thesis as a means of
determining how different actions fit together in order to comprise the entire situation.
Training data is collected using the Kinect sensor [3] and supporting software to
map joint positions. Machine learning methods are used for pose identification and
recognition.
1.2 Scope
The focus of the research is centered on
• Identifying the behaviors and postures that precede threatening actions/activi-
ties;
• Designing and training an algorithm to detect these behaviors and postures;
and
• Determining a classification and identification accuracy.
Behavior and posture identification is shown as part of the literature review in
Section 2.1.3.3 and Section 2.2.1. The identified postures and behaviors represent
a small subset of possibilities and should not be viewed as all inclusive. Potential
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algorithms and training methods are viewed in Section 2.2.3 and expanded upon in
Section 3.3. The method used and reasoning behind the selection can be found in
Chapter III. How the classification accuracy is determined is presented in Section 4.1
with the end results shown in Section 4.4.
1.3 Document Organization
Chapter II provides background information and discusses other efforts of similar
nature. Chapter III describes the approach used to solve the problem, assumptions
made, and general methodology. Chapter IV presents the results of this thesis and
the analysis of what those results mean. Chapter V summarizes the results of this
thesis effort and makes recommendations for future work.
4
II. Background
This chapter provides an overview of previous dismount threat recognition methods
and the necessary background for the work in this thesis. Various methods that are
used to detect the presence of a dismount within imagery, video, and other surveillance
data is discussed. A discussion on the dismount characterization information that
these detection methods provide is covered. A closer look at information useful in
making a threat level assessment is provided. Finally, information related to the
method chosen for development in this thesis and the technologies that enable it is
covered.
2.1 Dismount Detection and Characterization Methods
2.1.1 Detection Methods. Dismount detection is achieved in a couple differ-
ent ways. Detection can be accomplished using motion detection, gateway crossings,
skin detection, or other methods not discussed here. Motion detection involves analyz-
ing two or more frames, or images taken over a short duration to determine changes.
Stationary cameras work best for motion detection, but cameras with set locations
and known rates of movement can be incorporated. Draganjac et al. [1] use a form of
change detection by placing a camera directly above an entry point imaging the en-
try area. After removing the background information, the changed pixel clusters are
compared to various models to determine if a dismount is present. When a dismount
is perceived, they are tracked, within the systems field of view, as shown in Fig. 2.1.
Gateway crossing systems are commonly used and employed in many retail stores.
For example, a pair of sensors are placed on either side of a doorway or entry point
linked by an infrared beam. Anytime the beam is interrupted an alarm is activated,
indicating an entry or exit from the store. Gateway systems have the potential to
electronically interrogate dismounts as they traverse the designated operating area.
However, they have limited applicability since their operating area is limited and
they can be evaded or spoofed. Human skin has specific properties when viewed
with short wave infrared wavelengths and the visible spectra. Skin detection meth-
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ods search through frames of data to locate these properties [8, 10–13]. The method
used in [1] looks specifically for faces using computer models and feature extraction
techniques. The work in [8, 10–13] look for pixels that match skin characteristics in
order to narrow the field of view. Then they analyze relative positions and sizes of
clusters to confirm the presence of a dismount.
(a) (b)
Figure 2.1: Examples of dismount detection and tracking.
2.1.2 Detection Method Evaluation. Each detection method provides in-
formation about the dismounts present in the area. Motion detection and tracking
provides pathing data and changes within a scene. The path data may be used to de-
termine whether a dismount has been following a regular path, for example, planning
an attack or scoping out an area. The change detection portion highlights introduc-
tion of new objects to a scene or the disruption of objects to indicate tampering or
even placement of improvised explosive devices. A gateway system can provide the
number of dismounts in an area, rate of entry and exit, and electronically interro-
gate dismounts that pass through. When a hostile event occurs it is useful to know
the number of people that are involved in the situation in case someone is hiding or
knocked unconscious. High variances in rates of flow may indicate a situation has
arisen causing people to flee the scene; or that hostile dismounts have arrived at the
scene. Flow stoppages during regular hours of operation may also indicate a hostage
situation. Electronic interrogation may discover concealed weapons or explosive de-
vices as Grafulla-Gonzalez et al. discuss in [17].
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One application of skin detection is to identify malicious intent. In many soci-
eties around the world it is not customary to purposely hide your face while partici-
pating in day to day activities such as walking around town, visiting with friends, or
going to the store. However, if a dismount is evading cameras by purposely covering
their face, the amount of exposed skin is reduced and can be detected which may
indicate a threat. The system proposed by Draganjac et al. [1] uses two cameras.
The first camera is used for motion detection to indicate the presence of a dismount.
The second camera is used to scan for faces on the dismounts indicated. This method
is illustrated in Fig. 2.2. Some key problems with this methodology are that cultural
differences and weather variances are not taken into account. In some cultures it is
normal practice to cover the face with a veil. Also, not every region has fair weather
all the time; therefore, face covering is worn as protection from the elements.
(a) (b)
Figure 2.2: Example of two part system developed by Draganjac et al. [1]. The first
camera in (a) allows the detection and tracking of a dismount. The second camera in
(b) searches for a face to see if it is concealed or not.
Another application of skin detection is identification of race and ethnicity. The
primary reasoning behind this type of identification is to determine racial composition
of a crowd, and identifying individuals or groups that are not of similar ethnic origins
to their surroundings. If ethnic origin is not the same as those around them, it
may mean they are trying to infiltrate a specific location. This, by itself, is not
a strong indicator of a threat. There are a wide variety of legitimate reasons that
dismounts of multiple ethnicities would be in the same location, i.e. tourism and
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foreign exchange programs, etc.. In the grand scheme of dismount threat recognition
(DTR) this application of skin detection plays a minor role and merely helps serve as
a contributing factor to an integrated system approach.
2.1.3 Other Dismount Characterization Tools and Methods.
2.1.3.1 Object Detection. The objects dismounts carry play a large
role in the actions they are able to take. Some objects such as a gun held openly in
a dismounts hand, are clear signs of a threatening capability. However, objects and
equipment may not always be so readily visible. Equipment may be concealed under
baggy clothing, or carried inside a backpack. For the non-concealed case, a dismount
carrying weapons or explosives openly can be considered a threat. This type of threat
is easily determined with video surveillance actively monitored by a human. However,
it is impossible to guarantee that someone will be actively watching the appropriate
monitors at the right time. A system that extrapolates this information from the data
and then alerts a human in the loop to verify and respond is more effective.
A more difficult situation is that of concealed objects. For example, a suicide
bomber wearing a vest underneath his/her clothing. A method to detect the presence
of a hidden vest or presence of explosives would be highly useful. One useful short
range tool utilizes properties inherent to all things like the dielectric constant [17].
This tool uses millimeter-wave personnel scanners to determine the electromagnetic
properties of people and objects passing through the sensor field of view. These
properties are then referenced against tables of known attributes to determine the
composition of the objects. Objects composed of materials that are threatening gen-
erates an alarm [17]. The primary limitation of the millimeter-wave method is that
it requires a gateway system, as mentioned in Section 2.1.1, to be effective. If the
dismount evades the gateway or the emplacement of a gateway is simply not feasible,
then it cannot be applied.
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Figure 2.3: Fear subclasses, as determined by Clavel et al. [2], that can be deter-
mined through analysis of vocal patterns.
2.1.3.2 Acoustic Modeling. Work has been performed in the modeling
of stress and fear as indicated in speech patterns [2]. Often, it is known to a crowd
that something is amiss before a tragic event occurs. Monitoring speech patterns
of dismounts for these stress and fear indicators is used to indicate a possible event
occurring in the near future. The paper by Clavel [2] claims to have an accuracy
of 70.3% in determining fear from vocal response. The categorization of the three
subclasses of fear is shown in Fig. 2.3. This method requires:
• live audio data from the protected location,
• dismounts aware of, or with the impression that, a dangerous event is going to
occur,
• and enough fear to be present in their vocal patterns.
This system may help in small scale situations but may be too limited to be applicable
for large scale problems.
2.1.3.3 Human Behavioral Ontology. Human Behavioral Ontology
operates on the premise that the actions taken by a target individual or a group
give information that implies their intentions and future actions [18]. These action-
intention groupings serve as a starting point in true dismount threat recognition.
In order to make inferences from data, it is necessary to understand what the data
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means [18]. Cohen [18] seeks to model data retrieved through visual imagery as
human motion behaviors. Determining a subset of minor gestures, which meld into
motions and actions of an individual, an estimation of the intentions of the dismount
can be made [18]. Taking these motions to the next stage, Cohen’s procedure is
applied to individuals and crowds. The motions and actions are classified as normal or
aberrant, strange and possibly threatening, based on models. The threatening posture
of these motions are determined when compared to data collected preceding past
hostile actions [19]. Through the use of learning algorithms and event analysis of both
simulation and actual events, systems can learn to more accurately analyze and predict
certain situations [19]. One system uses a primary threat detection ontology (TDO)
with a secondary threat detection learning ontology (TDLO) which accomplishes an
analysis to provide more accurate information for the TDO [20]. While these methods
are very powerful, it does take a large effort to gather the needed data and teach these
ontology based protection systems to appropriately identify threats.
2.2 Pose Estimation and Enabling Technologies
2.2.1 Pose Estimation Related Work. Dismount pose estimation has been
a topic of interest for security, human-computer interaction, gaming, computer ani-
mation and simulation, and more for several years. Recent advances in this field are
due to the advent of real-time depth cameras. Grest et al. [21] use depth cameras to
track a skeleton of a specific size and known starting position. Anguelov et al. [22]
use 3D range scan data to segment puppets into head, limbs, torso, and background.
Zhu & Fujimura [23] build detectors using heuristics for coarse upper body estimation
of head, torso, and arms but require a T-pose to initialize the model. Plagemann et
al. [24] build a 3D mesh to find extrema interest points which are then classified as
head, hand, or foot. Shotton et al. [5] predict 3D joint positions using a single depth
image through an object recognition approach, and the design of intermediate body
part representations. The approach developed in [5] forms the basis for data collec-
tion efforts in this thesis. Fig. 2.4 is a graphical representation of the data output by
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Figure 2.4: Example joint estimates and skeleton mapping produced by the Kinect
sensor [3].
the Kinect sensor [3]. The sensor outputs 3D joint position estimates for: feet, an-
kles, knees, hips, hands, wrists, elbows, shoulders, head, neck, waist, and torso. The
methods described all strive to identify the position of the human body within the
scene, none of them associate a meaning or intent with the poses. The novel aspect
of this research is the interpretation of these poses and creating a link between what
the computer sees and the level of threat implied.
2.2.2 Enabling Technologies. Early efforts in pose estimation were hampered
by the difficulty in creating realistic intensity images through computer graphics, due
to the color and texture variability present from clothing, hair, and skin. It was often
necessary to resort purely to 2D silhouettes. Joint estimates using motion capture
equipment are useful for animation efforts but impractical for field use due to the
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requirements of sensors being placed on the subject of interest, as shown in Fig. 2.5.
The introduction of depth cameras removes the need for intermediate sensors or 3D
extraction from 2D information. Depth cameras use various methods to discern the
distance of each pixel necessary for 3D. Kinect [3] uses an infrared laser projector and
a monochrome CMOS sensor producing a 640x480 image at 30 frames per second with
a depth resolution of a few centimeters [5]. Depth cameras offer several advantages
over intensity sensors:
• they work in low light levels,
• give a calibrated scale estimate,
• are color and texture invariant,
• resolve pose ambiguities from silhouettes,
• are easy to synthesize,
• and simplify background subtraction [5].
Samples of real and synthetic data, produced by Shotton et al. [5] is shown in Fig. 2.6.
Notice the variety of body shapes, poses, clothing, and amount of cropping present
in the images.
2.2.3 Associative Memory Neural Networks. Memories are formed from
experiences. An event happens and the human brain makes changes so that the event
is remembered. An associative memory neural network (AMNN) seeks to mimic this
process using computers [25]. AMNNs are trained by passing through several input
vectors with predefined outcomes. These inputs are correlated with their respective
outputs through multiplication and then summed across the range of inputs to create
a memory matrix. Memories in the human brain can get mixed up and slightly
confused with each other, in an AMNN this is called crosstalk. Crosstalk occurs when
the weight matrix associated with one input and output pair contains information,
that when summed together, corrupts or alters another inputs respective values.
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Figure 2.5: Test subject and generated model. The subject is wearing the motion
capture equipment during a capture session; the superimposed skeletal model is gen-
erated automatically from the acquired motion capture data. The chest and pelvis
sensors are located on the subjects back [4].
Figure 2.6: Synthetic and real data. Pairs of depth image and ground truth body
parts [5].
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Once formed, the memory matrix is used to classify/associate future inputs with
those in the training set. The AMNN takes new or unseen inputs and correlates them
with the memory matrix to determine the closest match to a known input type and
declares the new input to be of that known type. This is useful for pose recognition
because even though the general pose may be similar from one dismount to another,
the exact positioning of joints will vary due to body types and personal preferences.
AMNNs are very good at ignoring the effects of noisy inputs or variations from the
training sets. AMNNs tolerance for noise and varience are the primary reasons it
was pursued in this thesis. For classification the memory matrix and the class labels
are the only pieces of information needed, making it easily transitioned to various
platforms.
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III. Methodology
This chapter details the methodology of the data collection and processing. This
includes the process of converting raw data into a usable data base, achieving sepa-
rability in the data, and defining the different poses (i.e. standing versus kneeling).
Finally, a breakdown of the classification process is discussed.
3.1 Data Collection
3.1.1 MySkeleton Program. Utilizing the software development kit (SDK),
made available by Microsoft, a program was created called MySkeleton. It uses Win-
dows 7 drivers and the natural user interface (NUI) and the application programming
interface (API), to support image and device management features. These features
include access to the Kinect [3] sensors, image and depth stream data, and the delivery
of processed image and depth data to support skeleton tracking.
Color and depth streams are a succession of frames collected and sent from
the Kinect [3]. A frame is the information contained within a single still image of a
particular type (e.g. depth, video, skeleton). The internal pipeline in the Kinect SDK
runtime processes depth-frame data to generate skeleton frames. A skeleton frame
event is determined by the API every time it processes a depth frame, even when no
skeleton is detected in the scene.
Kinect [3] produces a video stream that is a depth image of its field of view
and designates up to two dismounts by using different colors. Depth is shown in the
form of a color scale, the lighter the color the closer the area is to the sensor. An
image displaying the estimated joint locations and skeleton frame of the dismounts
being tracked is shown. Every joint is mapped, therefore to achieve the highest level
of accuracy, dismounts in their entirety need to be visible to the sensor. The Kinect
also produces a color VGA display of the scene. A sample of how the information is
displayed in the MySkeleton program is shown in Fig. 3.1. The data output from the
MySkeleton program is a text file, containing labeled joint position estimates as three
dimensional decimal values, which can be utilized by other programs [26].
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Figure 3.1: Sample view of data collection process using MySkeleton. Left frame
is a depth view of the scene with shades of grey indicating depth of background and
colored portion indicates the dismount. The center frame displays the joint location
estimates as a connected skeleton. The right frame is a color VGA display of the
scene.
3.1.2 Pose Collection. In order to collect data on the desired poses five
steps are followed:
• the dismount is placed in the field of view of the sensor,
• the desired pose is described to and assumed by the dismount,
• the MySkeleton program is run to acquire joint estimates from Kinect sensor,
• the MySkeleton program is closed to generate the output file,
• the output file is renamed and saved for later use.
The above process is repeated until an output file has been saved for each pose.
A list is maintained separately to match each collection with a brief textual description
of the pose contained in each sample. The poses are all oriented so that they will be
in a straight on view to the sensor. This operates on the assumption that the sensor
is located at or near the intended target of the dismount and enables the collection of
a wider variety of poses instead of the same poses with multiple orientations. Also,
the side view may be simulated by swapping the x and z values of the data. The
results of the pose collection process are detailed in Section 4.2.
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3.1.3 Pose Considerations. The data collection process utilized assumptions
of AMNN functionality. It is unnecessary to collect and train for poses at every
possible angle and position since an AMNN automatically assigns new inputs to their
closest match contained in the training data. An example of this is demonstrated in
Fig. 3.2, where the arms in Fig. 3.2 (a) are approximately orthogonal to the arms in
Fig 3.2 (b). When a test sample is observed, and all joint positions are the same as
Fig. 3.2 (a) and (b) except the arms, the network will map that pose to the closest
match between the pose in Fig. 3.2(a) or (b) based on the actual positions of the
arms.
Another consideration for collecting training poses is the aspect of being right
handed or left handed. Due to the functionality of AMNNs, if a pose is recorded and
trained into the network from a right handed subjects posturing, then an input of the
same type of pose but in a left handed manner will not be recognized as the same
threatening pose. Therefore, poses of the same type are collected based on dominant
hand or dominant leg, and trained into the network separately as type right or left.
An example of a right handed pose versus a left handed pose, when drawing a pistol
from a waist holster, is shown in Fig. 3.3.
Along the same lines as the right and left handed issue is the standing pose
versus the kneeling pose. Many standing poses have a pairing to a kneeling version of
the same pose. From an automated recognition viewpoint, this places a large discrep-
ancy in the data values as the vertical component values become closer together. To
reduce the confusion of standing or kneeling on the AMNN, the standing and kneeling
samples are grouped separately and only combined as needed during the training and
evaluation stages. The overall impact of this separation on accuracy is discussed in
Section 4.3.3.
3.2 Data Preprocessing
The data output by MySkeleton is given in decimal form up to six significant
digits with three pieces of information for each data point and a label. The first two
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(b) Pose 2
Figure 3.2: Joint position estimates extracted from Kinect. Example of collecting
orthogonal poses to train the AMNN. The positions of the arms in (a) are approxi-
mately orthogonal to those in (b). Keeping all other joint positions the same, any new
data with arms located somewhere between these two will be mapped to the closest
set.
pieces of information, referred to as the x and y coordinates, are the horizontal and
vertical distances of the joints relative to the center of the field of view. The third
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(a) Right Handed
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(b) Left Handed
Figure 3.3: Joint position estimates extracted from Kinect. (a) A right handed
pose where the dismount is drawing a pistol from a holster at their waste. (b) A left
handed pose where the dismount is drawing a pistol from a holster at their waste.
Both the right handed and left handed versions of poses are collected and used to
train the network.
piece of information, referred to as the z coordinate, is the depth/distance from the
sensor. Each set of x, y, and z coordinates are given a label to indicate which joint
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they represent. The labels are numerical from 0 to 19 and correspond to joints/body
parts as listed in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Labels and associated joints when output from the MySkeleton program.
Numbered Label Joint Represented
0 Groin
1 Abdomen
2 Neck
3 Head
4 Right Shoulder
5 Right Elbow
6 Right Wrist
7 Right Hand
8 Left Shoulder
9 Left Elbow
10 Left Wrist
11 Left Hand
12 Right Hip
13 Right Knee
14 Right Ankle
15 Right Foot
16 Left Hip
17 Left Knee
18 Left Ankle
19 Left Foot
3.2.1 Data Simplification. Each output file has multiple x, y, and z values
for each individual joint position due to the temporal range and sampling rate of
each sample. The result of these multiple values for each joint is shown in Fig. 3.4.
This thesis is focused on recognizing static poses, therefore, the data for each joint
is averaged to yield a single well defined estimate of each joint position as shown in
Fig. 3.5. In both Fig. 3.4 and Fig. 3.5, the (a) plot is the front view illustrating the
x and y coordinate data, while the (b) plot represents the z and y data.
3.2.2 Normalization. As previously stated the data values are the relative
distances of the joints based on the distance and field of view of the sensor. This
relative distance value can introduce variance in the data if the subject of interest
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(a) Front view
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(b) Side view
Figure 3.4: (a) Frontal view of data extracted from the sensor (x,y). (b) Side View
of data extracted from the sensor (z,y). Both views are using unprocessed data in its
original form
is not standing in the same location as the trained samples, thus normalization is
necessary. Normalization is accomplished by subtracting the respective x, y, and z,
values of the groin from all the joints, causing the groin location values to become
(0,0,0) and the rest of the joint positions to be relative to the groin. This normalization
21
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Distance from Vertical Axis Intersecting Center of Sensor (m)
D
is
ta
nc
e 
fro
m
 H
or
izo
nt
al
 A
xis
 In
te
rs
ec
tin
g 
Ce
nt
er
 o
f S
en
so
r (
m)
(a) Front view
1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Distance from Sensor (m)
D
is
ta
nc
e 
fro
m
 H
or
izo
nt
al
 A
xis
 In
te
rs
ec
tin
g 
Ce
nt
er
 o
f S
en
so
r (
m)
(b) Side view
Figure 3.5: (a) Frontal view of averaged data (x,y). (b) Side View of averaged
data (z,y). Both views are displaying the end result of noise and variance reduction
through averaging.
allows the data to be analyzed and compared regardless of where the test subject was
located within the sensor field of view.
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3.2.3 Creating Separability. Previous work with associative memory neural
networks using binary input values yields results with a high tolerance for noise [27].
Therefore, the data is converted to binary equivalent values. To remove the need
to manage sign bits, the data is shifted equally to become positive. This shifting is
achieved by adding a predetermined value, in this case 1.5m, to all the data values.
Since the normalizing point is the subjects groin, and human appendages are typically
equal to half their overall height, a value of 1.5m (≈5ft) accounts for human attributes
and includes a buffer.
Since binary values only represent whole numbers, the data is scaled by a factor
of 10,000. This factor preserves the data while enabling its conversion to binary.
In order to achieve greater separability, and yield a high level of accuracy, the data
is converted from binary values of 1’s and 0’s to bipolar values of 1’s and -1’s. A
comparison of the results using binary versus bipolar values is shown in Section 4.3.2.
By treating each character of the bipolar representation as a dimension, the conversion
to bipolar values effectively projects the three dimensional data into 45 dimensional
space, a 15 bit binary value for each of the original x, y, and z coordinates.
3.3 Training the Associative Memory Neural Network
Once the data is processed into a usable form, the AMNN is trained. As men-
tioned in Section 2.2.3, AMNNs require input vectors and the associated output vec-
tors, a˙ and b˙ respectively. The input vectors a˙ are formed through use of concatenation
on the bipolar data stored as 20x45 matrices per pose initially and becoming 900x1
vectors. The output vectors b˙ are binary, consisting of 0’s and a single 1 correspond-
ing to the pose its respective input vector represents. If the training set contained
only one sample of each pose then stacking the output vectors next to each other
would form an identity matrix. A sample output vector which would correspond to
the second input is shown in Eq. 3.1.
b˙2 =
[
0 1 0 0 · · · 0
]T
(3.1)
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The next stage required creation of a weight matrix for each input pose repre-
sented by W¨ (k). The k represents an individual training pattern or the kth pose. The
notation a˙k and b˙k are used to represent the input and output column vectors asso-
ciated with that pattern. Eq. 3.2 gives the general form for creating the individual
weight matrices, while Eq. 3.3 and Eq. 3.4 expand it into a more explicit view.
W¨ (k) = b˙k ∗ a˙
T
k (3.2)
W¨ (k) =


b1
b2
...
bm


[
a1 a2 · · · an
]
(3.3)
W¨ (k) =


b1a1 b1a2 · · · b1an
b2a1 b2a2 · · · b2an
...
...
...
...
bma1 bma2 · · · bman


(3.4)
Where W¨ (k) is the weight matrix associated with the kth input and output, a˙k
and b˙k are the k
th input and output vectors, a1 through an are the individual elements
of the input vector a˙, and b1 through bm are the individual elements of the output
vector b˙. n and m are the lengths of the input and output vectors respectively.
The completion of the weight matrices enables the final stage of the training
process in which the memory matrix is calculated. The memory matrix is a summation
of all the weight matrices, as indicated in Eq. 3.5 where p is the number of distinct
input patterns. The memory matrix can also be computed piecewise or expanded
using Eq. 3.6. The matrix M¨(0) is defined as the zero matrix containing no memory.
The main difference between Eq. 3.5 and Eq. 3.6 is that Eq. 3.5 is a batch learning
process and creates the memory matrix all at once, while Eq. 3.6 is updated with
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each new input. When k is equal to the number of training inputs both forms of the
equation yield the same result.
M¨ =
p∑
k=1
W¨ (k) (3.5)
M¨(k) = M¨(k − 1) + W¨ (k) (3.6)
Where M¨ is the full memory matrix, M¨(k) is the memory matrix up to the kth
input, p is the number of inputs, and W¨ (k) is the weight matrix associated with the
k
th input and output.
The final step in using an AMNN is utilizing the memory matrix to classify any
new or previously observed input patterns. This is accomplished through a process
referred to as recall, where the input vectors are assumed unit length, shown in
Eq. 3.7 [25]. The memory matrix is multiplied with an appropriately formed input
vector to create an output vector. The location/index of the highest value within
the output vector indicates which trained pose the input most closely resembles. For
example, if the vector in Eq. 3.8 is the result of an input vector times the memory
matrix then it would identify the input as being of type 2 since the highest value, 9
in this case, is located in the second position of the vector.
bˆ = M¨a˙i (3.7)
bˆ2 =
[
2 9 3 4 1 5
]T
(3.8)
Where M¨ is the memory matrix, a˙i is an input vector, bˆ is the estimate of a
trained output, and bˆ2 is an example of an output that is classified as the second
training type.
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3.4 The Network
As the memory matrices are created it is necessary to build a framework for
their use. Any newly observed data, for the purposes of this thesis, is assumed to be
collected using the Kinect [3] sensor and the MySkeleton program. The first stage is
to read in the data, average it, and normalize it. Then the data is shifted to become
positive and multiplied by 10000 to preserve the decimal values. Each x, y, z value
is then converted to its 15 bit binary representation and converted to bipolar values.
The data is then concatenated to transition from a matrix of values to a single vector.
Once vectorized, the data is applied to the memory matrix to form a recall
vector. The index of the maximum value in the recall vector determines the pose most
likely observed. Finally, the index is checked against the pose labels and classified
as threatening or non-threatening. The entire post collection threat determination
takes less than a second on a computer with a 3GHz processor. The accuracy of this
process and the validation techniques are discussed in Chapter IV.
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IV. Experimental Results and Analyses
This chapter documents the testing of proposed theories and methods throughout
this thesis and the experimental results they produced. A brief description of how
accuracy was measured and reported and a description of the data sets used during
the training and testing processes is given. The effects of various parameter and
method choices on overall accuracy is detailed. Finally, an accuracy estimate for the
end classifier and its tolerances is shown.
4.1 Determining Accuracy
This thesis is focused on determining whether a dismount is threatening or not
based on their posturing. Therefore any accuracy rating should indicate how often
a correct determination was made, and any acceptable tolerances. One method of
testing whether the system is working or not involves training and testing on the
same data set. When done properly, with well formatted data, the network will
recognize and correctly identify each pose.
Another method of measuring accuracy is to view the networks tolerance to
noise. Since the network is utilizing binary/bipolar inputs a noise effect is considered
anything that would cause a bit to be considered opposite of its true value when
the information reaches the processing stage. Noise effects are applied as a percent
of total bits, from 1% to 100% in single percentage increments, changed from their
original values. The location of the flipped bits is randomly selected at each noise
level and the process is repeated 100 times to discern a mean noise tolerance. See
also Fig. 4.2 for a sample of how the results are displayed upon completion.
Since the purpose of this thesis is to provide a threatening determination from
a pose an alternate measure of success is available. It is possible to consider the
network successful even in the event that a wrong pose was identified but it was still
of the correct threat determination. In several cases the poses most often confused
with each other are of the same threat level and yield a correct threat assessment
regardless of the actual pose being incorrect. As illustrated in Fig. 4.1 the overall
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accuracy for threat assessment remains high longer than the pose accuracy and never
drops completely to zero even in the presence of extremely high noise.
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Figure 4.1: Example of accuracy when considering correct pose identification versus
correct threat assessment. This is based on training and testing the network with the
same set of data.
4.2 Data Used
The data used for training and testing purposes throughout this thesis was
obtained through the collection process described in Section 3.1.2. A total of five
sets of data were collected across two dismounts. A set of data is considered to be a
collection of joint information for each pose of interest amounting to 26 unique poses
per set. A list of the poses contained within each set, their associated number, and
threat determination, is shown in Table 4.1 with a graphical view of each pose shown
in Appendix A. The only threat labels that could easily be interpreted differently are
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for poses 10 and 11, where the dismount is standing with a rifle in a carry position
in front of them. These two poses were labeled as non-threatening because it is the
assumed manner in which friendly military dismounts are viewed in scene and reduces
false positives. Another assumption is that a hostile dismount carrying a rifle seeks
to conceal their weapon as long as possible and never achieve the posturing described
by poses 10 and 11.
Table 4.1: Text description of poses collected, their numeric references, and asso-
ciated threat determination for each.
Label Threat Description
1 No Standing, arms down and held slightly away from sides
2 No Standing, arms straight up past the head
3 No Standing, arms straight out to the side
4 Yes Standing, drawing a pistol, waist holster, dominant right hand
5 Yes Standing, drawing a pistol, waist holster, dominant left hand
6 Yes Standing, aiming a pistol, dominant right hand
7 Yes Standing, aiming a pistol, dominant left hand
8 Yes Standing, aiming a rifle, dominant right hand
9 Yes Standing, aiming a rifle, dominant left hand
10 No Standing, carrying a rifle in front of body, dominant right hand
11 No Standing, carrying a rifle in front of body, dominant left hand
12 No Standing, waving with right hand in air, left arm at side
13 No Standing, waving with left hand in air, right arm at side
14 No Standing, reaching for handshake with right arm
15 No Standing, reaching for handshake with left arm
16 No Standing, arms crossed in front of chest
17 No Standing, hands behind head in surrender
18 No Standing, arms straight out in front of themselves
19 Yes Standing, throwing grenade with right hand
20 Yes Standing, throwing grenade with left hand
21 Yes Kneeling, aiming a pistol, dominant right hand
22 Yes Kneeling, aiming a pistol, dominant left hand
23 Yes Kneeling, aiming a rifle, dominant right hand
24 Yes Kneeling, aiming a rifle, dominant left hand
25 No Kneeling, hands behind head in surrender
26 No Kneeling, arms open as if to hug a child
Table 4.2 lists some characteristics about the dismounts involved in the data
collects and the data sets they are associated with. The subjects height is relevant
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Table 4.2: Test subject attributes and associated data sets
Subject designation Height (ft) Data Sets
Male1 5’9” Set1, Set2, Set3
Male2 6’2” Set4, Set5
due to its effect on joint relationships. The spacing of a dismounts joints will be
different based on their height and body shape.
4.3 Effects of Parameter and Method Choices
Various parameter and methodology choices are employed, the results of these
choices are geared toward improving the accuracy and applicability of the system as
a whole. The following sections explain and expand upon what these choices are and
their impact.
4.3.1 Decimel versus Bipolar. As mentioned in Section 3.2.3 a determina-
tion was made to convert the inputs from their original decimal form to a bipolar
representation. This had a major impact on the initial results as it provided much
needed separability. At the preliminary stages of training the decimal form data
showed anywhere from 5% - 20% accuracy when testing the network with the same
data it was trained with. However, when the data is converted to the bipolar form,
the network produces a 100% accuracy rating. As shown in Fig. 4.2 the conversion
to bipolar values causes a substantial increase in accuracy and noise tolerance.
4.3.2 Bipolar and Binary Values. The conversion of the data to bina-
ry/bipolar values has a clear and significant impact on the overall accuracy of the
network. In an effort to produce the best results the effects of using binary/bipolar
values for the inputs as well as the predefined output matrices are explored. This
results in four different test cases: binary inputs with binary output, binary inputs
with bipolar output, bipolar inputs with binary output, and bipolar inputs with bipo-
lar output. To allow direct comparison each test case is run using the same set of
data to train and test the respective networks. Fig. 4.3 illustrates the effects of these
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(b) Bipolar Form
Figure 4.2: Pose identification accuracy as the amount of data affected by noise is
increased. (a) shows the accuracy when using unprocessed decimal data. (b) shows
the accuracy when using data that is converted to a bipolar representation. In both
(a) and (b) the data used to train the network is also used to test the network.
four cases. The two cases using binary values in the output matrix, Fig. 4.3(a) and
Fig. 4.3(c), clearly outperform the bipolar output cases, Fig. 4.3(b) and Fig. 4.3(d).
The combination yielding the best results is the one with bipolar input values and a
binary output matrix, case (c) in Fig. 4.3. The bipolar inputs enable a wider range
of values in the weight matrices while the 0’s of the binary output matrix help to
reduce crosstalk, the effect one input has on another. Note that the results displayed
in Fig. 4.3 are created using the same data set to train and test the network and yield
higher accuracies than what is normally seen.
4.3.3 Standing and Kneeling Separation. Separation of standing and kneel-
ing poses proved to be unnecessary. This result came about after making the final
determination of using binary values to create the output matrix. The 0’s in the out-
put matrix aid to remove and almost eliminate the presence of crosstalk within the
network. As a result, the large degree of variance between the standing and kneeling
poses does not skew the memory matrix. In contrast, if a bipolar output matrix is used
the difference between the standing and kneeling poses heavily disrupts the memory
matrix. A comparison of the two output matrices affects is shown in Fig. 4.4. As seen
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(a) Binary → Binary
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(c) Bipolar → Binary
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(d) Bipolar → Bipolar
Figure 4.3: Comparison of results when using binary/bipolar inputs and outputs.
The notation labeling the graphs is as follows: x → y represents data of type x is
the input paired with an output of type y. Case (c) uses bipolar inputs and a binary
output matrix to train the network, and yields the most favorable results.
in Fig. 4.4(a) the initial accuracy is very low in the bipolar case but the overall drop
off rate remains similar to those seen when standing and kneeling poses are trained
and tested separately. The results in Fig. 4.4(b) for the binary case maintain a high
level of accuracy with a sharp decline around 50%. In both cases the same set of data
is used to train and test the network.
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(a) Bipolar Output
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(b) Binary Output
Figure 4.4: Accuracy levels obtained when the network is trained and tested with
a set of data containing both kneeling and standing poses. In (a) the output matrix
is defined with bipolar values. In (b) the output matrix is defined with binary values.
The results in (b) indicate that it is unnecessary to separate the standing and kneeling
data when a binary output matrix is used.
4.4 Classifier Accuracy
When collecting data, Set1 is taken independant of all other data, while the
others are collected in the following pairs: Set2 and Set3, and Set4 and Set5. This
yields data sets that are very similar to each other and produces high levels of accuracy
when trained and tested together, as can be seen in Fig. 4.5. The results of training
the network with a single set of data and then testing it with a set not closely related
are less favorable and can be seen in Fig. 4.6. In Fig. 4.6(a) the two sets are collected
at different times but with the same subject. This situation yields more favorable
results than Fig. 4.6(b) where the sets used to train and test the network are created
from different dismounts.
In order for the system to be useful it must be able to map seen and unseen
inputs to the appropriate threat or pose, thus the method used for validation is that of
K-fold cross validation. In K-fold cross-validation, the training data is divided into K
approximately equal sized groups, in this case 5 data sets. One of the sets is withheld
from the training step and is used as the test set. The other K - 1 sets are used to
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(b) Train Set3, Test Set2
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(c) Train Set4, Test Set5
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(d) Train Set5, Test Set4
Figure 4.5: Accuracy levels obtained when network is trained and tested with sets
of data that are very similar to each other. The dismount observed in Set2 and Set3
is different than the dismount in Set4 and Set5.
train the network, and this process is repeated for each of the possible K - 1 sets. The
result is an estimate for the systems accuracy when applied in a real world situation.
Since the order of training has no effect on the outcome, a K = 5 yields five
unique combinations of data sets for the K-folds validation. The results of these
five sets and their averaged output are shown in Fig. 4.7. Fig. 4.7(e) illustrates the
network viewing an unknown condition. The network of Fig. 4.7(e) is trained with
Male1 through Set2 and Set3, but Set1 is a unique data set. The collection of Set1
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(a) Train Set1, Test Set3
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(b) Train Set2, Test Set4
Figure 4.6: (a) Accuracy levels obtained when network is trained and tested with
disimilar sets from the same dismount. (b) Accuracy levels obtained when the network
is trained with a set from one dismount and tested with a set created by a different
dismount.
occurred weeks before the other two and no effort is made to mimick Set1, since each
data set is intended to be unique and provide as realistic data as possible.
It is useful to know what poses are being most often confused with each other.
This allows measure to be taken to achieve greater separation, as well as letting
the user know if the network has a chance to declare false positives with threat
determinations. Table 4.3 is the confusion matrix for indicating which poses are
identified correctly and incorrectly. Table 4.4 is the confusion matrix illustrating the
likelihood that a threat determination, regardless of pose, is correct. The rows are the
known input classes and the columns indicate what the network classifies the inputs
as. The abbreviations used and their description are:
• PA is the producers accuracy, the percentage of samples that belong to a given
class that are actually classified as that class,
• OE is the omission errors, percentage of samples belonging to the given class
but omitted,
• CA is the consumers accuracy, percentage of what is labeled as belonging to a
given class and is actually a member of that class,
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• CE is the commission errors, percentage of samples classified as a given class
not belonging to that class,
• Kappa is the kappa statistic, a value bounded between -1 and 1 indicating the
level of agreement between actual classes and predicted classes.
In Table 4.3 the PA and CA values fluctuate between 0% and 100%. This
indicates that some poses are unique enough to be readily identified and others are
often confused with other poses. In contrast, the PA and CA values in Table 4.4
are consistently high indicating high levels of correct threat discernment. A closer
inspection of Table 4.3 reveals that the poses which get commonly confused with each
other are the ones involving weapons. Since threat is being viewed in a binary manner
of threatening or non-threatening, this confusion is acceptable. Another point worth
mentioning is that the kneeling rifle poses were rarely identified correctly and only
chosen as the estimate once during the K-fold cross validation, indicating a lack of
consistency for those poses in the training data or that their inclusion is not necessary
given the standing versions of those poses. The Kappa statistics for both Table 4.3
and Table 4.4 are similar, 0.51 and 0.61 respectively. This similarity is expected since
both tables are based on the same data. The kappa values suggest that the model is
in moderate to good agreement with the truth data.
4.5 Analysis of Results and Summary
The accuracy of the system is determined in two ways: through correct identifi-
cation of the pose presented, and making a correct threat determination. The effects
of using binary versus bipolar values for the input values and the output values are
explored. The results are that the best levels of accuracy are obtained when the
inputs are bipolar and the output matrix is binary.
The separation of the standing and kneeling poses is unnecesary as the crosstalk
is reduced through the use of the binary output matrix. If the bipolar output matrix
is desired then separation does have a significant impact on system accuracy. The
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Table 4.3: Confusion matrix based on correct pose identification. The producers
accuracy (PA) and consumers accuracy (CA) vary with each pose, indicating that
some poses are more distinct and easier to recognize than others. A Kappa statistic
value of 0.51 indicates a high level of agreement between the actual and predicted
classifications.
Estimated Class
Truth 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 1213141516171819 20 2122 23 24 25 26 #Samples PA% OE%
1 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 80 20
2 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 100 0
3 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 20 80
4 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 100 0
5 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 100 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 40 60
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 40 60
8 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 100
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 60 40
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 80 20
11 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 100
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 100 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 100 0
14 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 40 60
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 80 20
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 60 40
17 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 60 40
18 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 60 40
19 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 20 80
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 100
21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 5 40 60
22 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 5 60 40
23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 5 20 80
24 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 100
25 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 5 20 80
26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 100 0
Totals 6 8 2 6 9 7 11 1 8 5 1 6 9 3 7 8 6 6 2 2 5 5 1 0 1 5 69
CA% 67635083562918 0 3880 0 8356675738505050 0 4060100100100100 Kappa
CE% 33375017447182100622010017443343625050501006040 0 0 0 0 0.51
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Table 4.4: Confusion matrix based on threat determination. The producers accu-
racy (PA) and consumers accuracy (CA) are both high with a Kappa statistic of 0.61.
This indicates a high level of agreement between the actual and predicted classifica-
tions.
Estimated Class
Truth Non-Threat Threat Samples PA% OE%
Non-Threat 59 11 70 84.29 15.71
Threat 14 46 60 76.67 23.33
Totals 73 57
CA% 80.82 80.70 Kappa
CE% 19.18 19.30 0.61
network is trained and tested with various combinations of data in an effort to discern
the best way to achieve accurate results in an operational environment. For use in a
limited environment, focused on watching one or two select dismounts, a small set of
training data geared toward the dismount of interest will achieve very good results.
In order to be used on a larger scale, a wide range of training data is preferred to
expose the network to wider variety of body types and pose variations. The more
versions of a pose that the network is trained with the more accurate the network will
be.
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(a) Test Set5, Train Others
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(b) Test Set4, Train Others
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
% of flipped bits from original
%
 C
or
re
ct
ly 
id
en
tif
ie
d
 
 
Correct Pose
Correct Threat
(c) Test Set3, Train Others
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(d) Test Set2, Train Others
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(e) Test Set1, Train Others
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(f) Average accuracy K = 5
Figure 4.7: K - folds cross-validation with K = 5. (a) - (e) are trained using all but
the identified test set. (f) is the average of all cases.
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V. Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter summarizes the methods used, and conclusions reached, as a result of
this thesis effort. Potential avenues for future work are presented, and a few of the
contributions this work yields to the field of dismount threat recognition are discussed.
5.1 Summary of Methods and Conclusions
The main focus of this thesis is to enable a computer system to observe and
recognize dangerous situations. This is attempted through the use of associative
memory neural networks (AMNN) and joint mapping methods developed by Shotton
et al [5]. The process involved using a real time depth camera, the Kinect, to observe
a dismount and provide joint position estimates through the method developed in [5].
The information is extracted from the Kinect using the software development kit
provided by Microsoft and a separate program developed at AFIT. The joint position
estimates are collected for several different poses performed by two individuals.
The data is then pre-processed to transition from the raw decimal numbers
to a binary representation of the values. The binary data is converted one more
time to bipolar to increase data separability, and used to train an AMNN. Several
training and testing combinations are performed to discern the combinations that yield
the best results, both initially and in the presence of noise. Accuracy is measured
both in terms of correct pose identification as well as proper threat determination.
The threat determination consistantly yields equal or better accuracies than the pose
identification.
Overall, this thesis successfully proved the concept of the ability to automatically
discern whether a situation is threatening or not. Using the results from Fig. 4.7(f),
the best estimate for real world threat discernment accuracy is approximately 81%.
This number is not entirely indicative of real-world accuracy as the testing data is
limited in scope for this thesis. Methods to make the accuracy better is discussed in
Section 5.2. Given the relatively high results for the threat discernment, automated
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pose recognition could be refined and deployed as part of a larger dismount threat
recognition package or used alone as a means of early warning.
5.2 Future Work
This research effort proposed and tested a new method of discerning the threat
level of a dismount. Although it is successful in proving the concept, there is more
work to accomplish to improve, refine, or streamline the process.
A major area for improvement is to collect more training data. This data can
be a greater number of unique poses for the network to learn and be ready for, as well
as collection from a larger variety of body shapes. The general poses may appear the
same to an observer, but the relative joint positions will vary to what is comfortable
and familiar to the subject. Having a larger data set to train and test with would
allow the accuracies generated to be more representative of a fielded system.
Improvements to the flow of the system can be made so that it will operate in
real-time. The current process is not real-time because of a disconnect between the
Kinect output and the data processing element. Currently the MySkeleton program
runs the Kinect for a few seconds to generate joint position estimates, the program
is closed to generate the output file, and then data is read and processed. The post
collection processing takes under a second and the Kinect generates the estimates in
real time, but the syncing of the two processes is needed.
This effort focused on discrete poses and capturing the threatening events or
indicators at certain points. A possible alternative is to analyze a pattern of motion.
The patterns could be as short as the motions of drawing a pistol up a few inches out
of its holster or the full swing of the arm from drawing to pointing a weapon. The
motion aspect could even be combined with the static pose analysis to provide a two
pronged approach.
Aside from pose identification, there are many other aspects of a situation that
may prove useful to threat identification. The inclusion of context analysis to this
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method could help to reduce false positives. The current method indicates a threat
if the dismounts joints match a trained threat. The ability to determine whether
the weapon being held is a toy or an actual weapon would be very useful. Object
recognition is just one of many possible additions to a greater threat recognition
toolbox approach.
5.3 Contributions
The area of dismount threat recognition has a large number of possible avenues
to explore to achieve its goal. This thesis showed the viability of using automatic
pose recognition to discern the threat a dismount presents. It also demonstrated
the potential of associative memory neural networks which can readily be applied in
other ways. If the methods described in this thesis are employed, as part of a larger
dismount threat recognition system or alone, they will provide invaluable information
to prevent loss of life.
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Appendix A. Samples of Collected Poses
This appendix contains a sample of each pose used for training and testing purposes.
The poses are shown in the same order as they are listed in Table 4.1, with a front
and side view as they appear in Matrix Laboratory (MatLab).
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(b) Side View
Figure A.1: Pose 1, Standing, arms down and held slightly away from sides, non-
threatening.
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(b) Side View
Figure A.2: Pose 2, Standing, arms straight up past the head, non-threatening.
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(b) Side View
Figure A.3: Pose 3, Standing, arms straight out to the side, non-threatening.
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(b) Side View
Figure A.4: Pose 4, Standing, drawing a pistol, waist holster, dominant right hand,
threatening.
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(b) Side View
Figure A.5: Pose 5, Standing, drawing a pistol, waist holster, dominant left hand,
threatening.
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(b) Side View
Figure A.6: Pose 6, Standing, aiming a pistol, dominant right hand, threatening.
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(b) Side View
Figure A.7: Pose 7, Standing, aiming a pistol, dominant left hand, threatening.
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(b) Side View
Figure A.8: Pose 8, Standing, aiming a rifle, dominant right hand, threatening.
46
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Distance from Vertical Axis Intersecting Center of Sensor (m)
D
is
ta
nc
e 
fro
m
 H
or
izo
nt
al
 A
xis
 In
te
rs
ec
tin
g 
Ce
nt
er
 o
f S
en
so
r (
m)
(a) Front View
1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Distance from Sensor (m)
D
is
ta
nc
e 
fro
m
 H
or
izo
nt
al
 A
xis
 In
te
rs
ec
tin
g 
Ce
nt
er
 o
f S
en
so
r (
m)
(b) Side View
Figure A.9: Pose 9, Standing, aiming a rifle, dominant left hand, threatening.
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(b) Side View
Figure A.10: Pose 10, Standing, carrying a rifle in front of body, dominant right
hand, non-threatening.
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(b) Side View
Figure A.11: Pose 11, Standing, carrying a rifle in front of body, dominant left
hand, non-threatening.
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(b) Side View
Figure A.12: Pose 12, Standing, waving with right hand in air, left arm at side,
non-threatening.
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(b) Side View
Figure A.13: Pose 13, Standing, waving with left hand in air, right arm at side,
non-threatening.
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(b) Side View
Figure A.14: Pose 14, Standing, reaching for handshake with right arm, non-
threatening.
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(b) Side View
Figure A.15: Pose 15, Standing, reaching for handshake with left arm, non-
threatening.
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(b) Side View
Figure A.16: Pose 16, Standing, arms crossed in front of chest, non-threatening.
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(b) Side View
Figure A.17: Pose 17, Standing, hands behind head in surrender, non-threatening.
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(b) Side View
Figure A.18: Pose 18, Standing, arms straight out in front of themselves, non-
threatening.
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(b) Side View
Figure A.19: Pose 19, Standing, throwing grenade with right hand, threatening.
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(b) Side View
Figure A.20: Pose 20, Standing, throwing grenade with left hand, threatening.
52
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Distance from Vertical Axis Intersecting Center of Sensor (m)
D
is
ta
nc
e 
fro
m
 H
or
izo
nt
al
 A
xis
 In
te
rs
ec
tin
g 
Ce
nt
er
 o
f S
en
so
r (
m)
(a) Front View
1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Distance from Sensor (m)
D
is
ta
nc
e 
fro
m
 H
or
izo
nt
al
 A
xis
 In
te
rs
ec
tin
g 
Ce
nt
er
 o
f S
en
so
r (
m)
(b) Side View
Figure A.21: Pose 21, Kneeling, aiming a pistol, dominant right hand, threatening.
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(b) Side View
Figure A.22: Pose 22, Kneeling, aiming a pistol, dominant left hand, threatening.
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(b) Side View
Figure A.23: Pose 23, Kneeling, aiming a rifle, dominant right hand, threatening.
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(b) Side View
Figure A.24: Pose 24, Kneeling, aiming a rifle, dominant left hand, threatening.
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(b) Side View
Figure A.25: Pose 25, Kneeling, hands behind head in surrender, non-threatening.
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(b) Side View
Figure A.26: Pose 26, Kneeling, arms open as if to hug a child, non-threatening.
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